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Italian university system was reformed in 2001. This paper tests the screening role of degree
scores for 2004-Italian graduates. We ﬁnd support of the strong screening hypothesis for pre-
reform type degrees, while we do not ﬁnd any evidence of signalling eﬀects for post-reform
3-years degrees. We gauge that the shutting down of the signal can be partially ascribed
to the poor quality of students who obtained a 3-years degree without taking any further
education.
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1 Introduction
Educational performance is expected to increase earnings for at least two reasons. First, accord-
ing to the human capital theory, education directly enhances individual productivity augmenting
the skills of the agents: Becker [1964]. Second, the screening hypothesis predicts that education
acts a signal of productivity: Arrow [1973].Distinguishing between the two approaches has im-
portant policy implications: see Chevalier et al. [2004] for a discussion.
In this brief paper we analyze the eﬀects of students’ performance at university on remuner-
ations.1 In particular, we consider the cohort of 2004 Italian graduates, whose information on
earnings was gathered three years after graduation (i.e. in 2007), and we empirically test the
screening role of education. Such a sample is particularly interesting because Italian university
was reformed in 2001.2 The traditional one-tier model of a 4/6-years degree has been changed
into a two-tier one. The new system is characterized by a 3-years degree (i.e. ﬁrst cycle), also
known as “short degree”, and a sub-sequent 2-years degree (i.e. secondary cycle), called “master
degree”. The overall 5-years degree takes the name of “long degree”. So that, our sample is
∗Dipartimento di Economia Politica e Metodi Quantitativi, Via San Felice 5, 27100 Pavia, Italy,
castca@eco.unipv.it, tel.++390382986217, fax.++390382304226, corresponding author.
1Full details on our measure of students’ performance (i.e. Edperf ) can be found in Section 2.
2The 2001 reform of Italian university system pertains to the so-called “Bologna process”. The latter is
aimed at building the European Higher Education Area and, thus, at facilitating the mutual recognition of
degrees across the higher education institutions of the 47 participating countries. For further details, see:
http://www.ond.vlaanderen.be/hogeronderwijs/bologna/
1made by the ﬁrst Italian cohort of “short graduates” and the last cohort of pre-reform students,
which we call “old graduates”.
The present work ﬁts into the recent and enlarging literature that analyzes distinct aspects
of the Italian university reform: see among others Bosio and Leonardi [2010], Bratti et al. [2010],
Cappellari and Lucifora [2009], Cutillo and Di-Pietro [2006], Boero et al. [2005]. In particular,
the aim of this paper is assessing both the “strong” (SSH) and the “weak” screening hypotheses
(WSH), for both short and old degrees. According to the SSH, schooling is merely a signal
of (potential) employee’s productivity; conversely, the WSH states that education is both a
signalling and an enhancing-productivity device: Psacharopoulos [1979] and Heywood and Wei
[2004]. Consistently with Castagnetti et al. [2005], we ﬁnd supportive evidence for the SSH for
old graduates3 while no evidence of signalling is provided for the short ones. This kind of evi-
dence can be interpreted in the light of Bratti et al. [2010], which shows a reduction of university
standards for short degrees, and on the basis of Cappellari and Lucifora [2009] and Cutillo and
Di-Pietro [2006], which document higher enrollment and lower drop-out rates for short degrees
compared to old ones. Thus, after the reform, the quantity of low ability graduates might have
increased. Moreover, the inﬂation of short degrees grades found by Bratti et al. [2010] might
have reduced the signalling function of college performance, so that ﬁrms might ﬁnd more dif-
ﬁculties in selecting high-ability job applicants on the basis of university’s grades. Our exercise
will show that these lines of explanation hold in the present case. Finally, it is worth underlying
that the fading of the signal for short degrees does not necessarily imply a null graduate wage
premium. In fact, the recent work of Bosio and Leonardi [2010] documents that such a premium
has shrunk for short graduates relatively to the old ones but it has not disappeared.
The present work adds to the existing literature on screening in at least two ways. First: our
measure of students’ performance combines information on both grades and degree-completion
time. As recently underlined by Brodaty et al. [2009], in order to capture the true signalling
function of grades, both grade and time dimensions must be taken into account. As a matter of
fact, individuals who complete their academic career slowly and/or achieve low test scores send
a poor ability signal to employers. Second: we employ the earnings information which were reg-
istered at the early stage of graduates’ career (i.e. three years after graduation). This fact makes
the signalling function of grades retrievable. This is because, as the employers discover the (un-
observed) ability of employees after few years only, the impact of job-market signalling eﬀects is
limited to the beginning of workers’ professional life: Lange [2007] and Altonji and Pierret [2001].
2 Data
Our data come from the 2007-wave of the “Survey on Labor Market Transitions of Univer-
sity Graduates” carried out by the Italian National Statistical Oﬃce (i.e. ISTAT). As already
mentioned, the cohort of 2004 Italian graduates was interviewed. The retrospective informa-
tion gathered allows us to analyze both academic performance (i.e. ﬁnal degree grades) and
earnings at ﬁrst labor market entry (i.e. three years after graduation). The population of 2004-
graduates amounts to 260.070 individuals (167.886 old graduates and 92.184 short graduates).
The response rate was about 69.5%, so that the surveyed individuals are 47.300 (26.570 old and
20.730 short). The Survey contains a wide range of information on (i) university career and high
3The data analyzed in Castagnetti et al. [2005] were derived from the “Survey on Labour Market Transitions
of University Graduates” carried out in 2001 by the Italian National Institute of Statistics. The graduate students
considered were those who completed in 1998 a course whose duration was four years or more, because the Italian
university system was based on a one-tier model, without any possibility of intermediate exit.
2school background; (ii) work experience; (iii) job search; (iv) family information; (v) personal
characteristics.4 We exclude individuals who graduated in medical ﬁelds, because their career
is very diﬀerent from that of all other graduates.5 Further, we restrict the estimating sample
to full-time workers, deﬁned as those who work more than 30 hours per week. This choice is
motivated by the lack of hourly-wages information. After these corrections, the sample reduces
to 10.153 and 9.604 individuals, for old and short degrees respectively.
As already mentioned, our measure of students’ performance combines information on grades
and completion time. This variables is called Edperf and it is calculated as the product of
the ﬁnal degree mark and the inverse of the degree-completion time. Formally, [Edperf =
(dscore)/(1 + 0.1 ∗ years)] where dscore is the degree mark and years is the number of years
used to get the degree. The degree scores have been normalized to take into account that dif-
ferent faculties might employ diﬀerent marking scale and diﬀerent duration. Finally, the upper
bound limit of Edperf is set to 113, which corresponds to honors degree with no delay in com-
pletion.
3 Methodology and Results
Employing the Heckman [1979] two-step procedure to control for self-selection,6 we estimate the
earnings functions for full-time employees and the self-employed, for both old and short degrees.
Following the seminal ideas of Wolpin [1977] and Riley [1979], we assume that self-employed
workers have no need to signal innate ability to a future employer, so that the returns to ed-
ucation in this case are nothing but true returns to human capital. Then, if the WSH holds,
we expect a signiﬁcant positive return on education for the self-employed, but a signiﬁcantly
higher positive return for employees. The SSH, in contrast, implies an insigniﬁcant return on
education for the self-employed, but a signiﬁcantly positive return for employees: Brown and
Sessions [1998] and Brown and Sessions [1999].
The estimated earnings functions are reported in Table 1.7 Looking at the ﬁrst row of the table,
it is easy to see that our estimates support the SSH for old graduates only. In fact, the edu-
cational performance proxy (i.e. Edperf ) is statistically insigniﬁcant for the old self-employed
but it is positive and signiﬁcant for the employees. Turning to short graduates, as the Edperf
coeﬃcient is always insigniﬁcant, we do not ﬁnd evidence for either the SSH or the WSH. This
result is robust under diﬀerent speciﬁcations. Here, we report just the most complete ones.
Moreover, it is worth noting that Castagnetti et al. [2005] ﬁnd the same result for the cohort of
pre-reform Italian 1998-graduates. So that, the SSH for old Italian graduates seems to be quite
well established.
At this point, it is compelling to ask why the signalling mechanism does not work for short
graduates. We start tackling this issue looking to the distributions of Edperf for old and short
2004-cohort graduates and for the 1998-cohort, reported in Figure 1. It is important to stress
that we considered only the short graduates who did not take any further education (i.e. master,
4More precisely, the number of variables reported is the following: 64 for category (i), 67 for (ii), 7 for (iii), 13
for (iv) and 14 for (v).
5After having obtained their degree in medicine, students usually carry out a specializing medical school which
lasts 3 years at least.
6The Heckman [1979] procedure allows to obtain consistent estimates when individuals take their choice (i.e.
employee vs self-employed, in this case) because they have a comparative advantage, ﬂawing the hypothesis of
a randomly selected sample (i.e. selection bias). In our data, we observe a negative selection bias for short
employees only. See Lambda coeﬃcients in Table 1.
7Please note that, due to space reasons, we omit the ﬁrst-step estimates, which are available upon request.
3specialization course,...) after obtaining the 3-years degree. From the graph, it is evident the
anomalous concentration around the highest values in the short graduates’ distribution. It could
also be seen that both distributions of old degrees are more bell-shaped. Moreover, the median
values of Edperf are: 92 for 2004-old degrees, 87 for 1998-old degrees and 102 for 2004-short
degrees. From the results on the screening hypotheses, we know that the outstanding perfor-
mance of short graduates is not remunerated in the labor market. We propose to explain these
ﬁndings through the post-reform reduction of university standards found by Bratti et al. [2010].
Following Chevalier [2003], we take High School Marks as a proxy for students’ ability and we
evaluate the probability of enrolling in a short degree. Table 2 reports the results. The ﬁrst
row of the table shows the inverse correlation between ability and the probability of attending a
short degree course, while the second row reinforces such a ﬁnding employing the Liceo Classico-
Scientiﬁco dummy variable, which is equal to one in the case the students attended these type
of high schools, which are traditionally the most demanding. Thus, we can conclude that the
signalling value of Edperf was shut down by the low quality of the students who completed a
short degree and who did not take any further education.
4 Concluding remarks
This brief paper has shown that the signalling value of students’ performance at university has
faded away for the ﬁrst cohort of “short” Italian graduates, while such a device appears as
eﬀective as before for pre-reform type graduates. Consistently with the established literature,
we also ﬁnd evidence that the shutting down of the signal can be partially ascribed to the poor
quality of students who obtained a short degree, without taking any further education.
Some further research questions appear as very interesting and they will be tackled as soon
as the 2011 release of the ISTAT Graduate Survey will be available. In particular: does the
screening hypotheses hold for long degrees? Are there any diﬀerences in the graduate premium
for short and long degrees? If yes, why? Has the signalling device changed from degree grades
to degree duration?
Acknowledgements
We are grateful to Paolo Bertoletti and Alberto Cavaliere for helpful comments and suggestions
and seminar partecipants at Pavia University Seminar. The usual disclaimer applies.
4References
J. Altonji and C. Pierret. Employer learning and statistical discrimination. Quarterly Journal
of Economics, 116:313–50, 2001.
K. J. Arrow. Higher education as a ﬁlter. Journal of Public Economics, 3:193–216, 1973.
G. S. Becker. Human Capital. Columbia university press; 3d edition edition, 1964.
G. Boero, T. Laureti, and R. Naylor. An econometric analysis of student withdrawal and
progression in post-reform italian universities. Technical report, CRENOS, W.P. 04, 2005.
G. Bosio and M. Leonardi. The eﬀect of 3+2 on the graduate labor market: demand and supply.
mimeo, November 2010.
M. Bratti, C. Broccolini, and S. Staﬀolani. Higher education reform, student time allocation
and academic performance in italy: Evidence from a faculty of economics. Rivista Italiana
degli Economisti, (15):275–304, 2010.
O. Brodaty, R.J. Gary-Bobo, and A. Prieto. Does speed signal ability? a test of spence’s
theory. Technical report, Centre de Recherche en Economie et Statistique. Working Papers
No 2009-02, 2009.
S. Brown and J.G. Sessions. Education, employment status and earnings: a comparative test of
the strong screening hypothesis. Scottish Journal of Political Economy, 45(5):586–591, 1998.
S. Brown and J.G. Sessions. Education and employment status: a test of the strong screening
hypothesis in italy. Economics of Education Review, (18):397–404, 1999.
L. Cappellari and C. Lucifora. The bologna process and college enrolment decisions. Labour
Economics, 16(6):638–647, 2009.
C. Castagnetti, F. Chelli, and L. Rosti. Educational performance as signalling device: Evidence
from italy. Economics Bulletin, 9(4):1–7, 2005.
A. Chevalier. Measuring over-education. Economica, (70):509–531, 2003.
A. Chevalier, C. Harmon, I. Walker, and Y. Zhu. Does education raise productivity, or just
reﬂect it? The Economic Journal, (114):499–517, 2004.
A. Cutillo and G. Di-Pietro. University quality and labour market outcomes in italy. Labour,
20(1):37–62, 2006.
J. J. Heckman. Sample selection bias as a speciﬁcation error. Econometrica, 1(47):153–161,
1979.
J. S. Heywood and X. Wei. Education and signaling: Evidence from a highly competitive labor
market. Education Economics, 12:1–16, 2004.
F. Lange. The speed of employer learning. Journal of Labor Economics, 25:1–35, 2007.
G. Psacharopoulos. On the weak versus strong version of the screening hypothesis. Economic
Letters, 4:181–185, 1979.
J. G. Riley. Testing the educational screening hypothesis. Journal of Political Economy, 5:
S227–S252, 1979.
K. Wolpin. Education and screening. The American Economic Review, 67:949–958, 1977.

















60 70 80 90 100 110






























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































7Table 2: Probit Simple
(1) (2) (3) (4)
High School Grade -0.027*** -0.027*** -0.028*** -0.027***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Liceo Classico-Scientiﬁco -0.352*** -0.341*** -0.350*** -0.339***
(0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019)
Father self-employed -0.066*** -0.068*** -0.078*** -0.080***
(0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020)
Female 0.092*** 0.089*** 0.090*** 0.088***
(0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019)
Father Degree -0.348*** -0.285*** -0.354*** -0.294***
(0.025) (0.028) (0.026) (0.028)
Mother Degree -0.164*** -0.158***
(0.031) (0.032)
Constant 0.486*** 0.471*** 0.252* 0.242*
(0.075) (0.075) (0.104) (0.104)
Regional Dummies No No Yes Yes
Uni Course Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 30123.000 30123.000 30123.000 30123.000
LR Chi2 11517.369 11545.079 11944.675 11969.820
Prob>Chi2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Pseudo-R2 0.314 0.315 0.326 0.327
Log Likelihood -1.26e+04 -1.25e+04 -1.23e+04 -1.23e+04
8